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Abstract
Background In this paper, we reviewed translational studies concerned with environmental influences on the rewarding effects of
heroin versus cocaine in rats and humans with substance use disorder. These studies show that both experienced utility (‘liking’)
and decision utility (‘wanting’) of heroin and cocaine shift in opposite directions as a function of the setting in which these drugs
were used. Briefly, rats and humans prefer using heroin at home but cocaine outside the home. These findings appear to challenge
prevailing theories of drug reward, which focus on the notion of shared substrate of action for drug of abuse, and in particular on
their shared ability to facilitate dopaminergic transmission.
Aims Thus, in the second part of the paper, we verified whether our findings could be accounted for by available computational
models of reward. To account for our findings, a model must include a component that could mediate the substance-specific
influence of setting on drug reward
Results It appears of the extant models that none is fully compatible with the results of our studies.
Conclusions We hope that this paper will serve as stimulus to design computational models more attuned to the complex
mechanisms responsible for the rewarding effects of drugs in real-world contexts.
Keywords Heroin . Cocaine . Reward . Pleasure . Motivation . Utility . Opioid . Psychostimulant . Addiction
Introduction
It is well known that, under certain conditions, some individ-
uals eagerly self-administer drugs such as heroin and cocaine.
The rewarding effects of these drugs differ from those of nat-
ural stimuli because drugs can act on the relevant circuitry of
the brain without first stimulating one of the five major senses
and in the absence of specialized homeostatic mechanisms
regulating their intake. In the past five decades, a vast body
of work has clarified in great detail the molecular targets of
most abused substances, but the exact mechanisms responsi-
ble for their rewarding effects are still not clear from both a
neurobiological and conceptual point of view. The nature of
some of the obstacles that make this aim difficult to achieve
will become clear in the remaining of this paper. For the mo-
ment, we list three issues that might sound surprising to some
readers. First, the neurobiological mechanisms responsible for
the euphoriant effects of drugs (‘drug pleasure’) are poorly
understood. For example, there is considerable evidence indi-
cating that the mesolimbic dopaminergic system does not me-
diate pleasure or ‘drug pleasure’ (for reviews, see Robinson
and Berridge 1993; Berridge 2012; Berridge and O’Doherty
2014), but it is less appreciated that it even may not play a
necessary role in the reinforcing effects of drug such as opi-
oids and alcohol (see Badiani et al. 2011; Nutt et al. 2015), or
even in drug reward in general (see Ikemoto 2010). Second,
the behavioral and neurobiological effects of drugs are pow-
erfully modulated by the circumstances surrounding drug use
(e.g., Zinberg 1984; Stewart et al. 1984; Stewart and Badiani
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1993; Badiani et al. 1995a, 1998, 1999; Kendler et al. 2003;
Paolone et al. 2004; Badiani and Robinson 2004; Robinson
and Kolb 2004; Badiani 2013). Third, despite the explosion of
research in artificial intelligence and computational modeling,
our understanding of the neural algorithms regulating moti-
vated behavior in the real world is still extremely rudimentary.
This is particularly true of drug-taking behavior, as relatively
little work has focused on the rewarding effects of drugs from
a computational point of view.
In this paper, we will first review translational studies
showing that the setting of drug use can influence in opposite
directions the rewarding effects of opioids (e.g., heroin) versus
psychostimulants (e.g., cocaine) in rats and humans. The find-
ings from these studies challenge the still prevailing unitary
notion of drug reward that focus on the shared ability of drugs
to activate dopaminergic transmission (e.g., Wise 1980; Di
Chiara and Imperato 1988; Robinson and Berridge 1993;
Nestler 2001, 2004; Hyman et al. 2006; Koob and Volkow
2010; Berridge 2012; Covey et al. 2014; Keiflin and Janak
2015; Volkow and Morales 1995; Volkow et al. 2017;
Berridge and Robinson 2016; Keramati et al. 2017). This no-
tion is so entrenched that, despite robust evidence to the con-
trary (see Badiani et al. 2011, 2018; Nutt et al. 2015), it is
portrayed as a fact even in policy-making documents
(Surgeon General’s Report on the consequences of alcohol
and drug abuse on health 2016; https://addiction.
surgeongeneral.gov/). The aim of this paper is therefore to
verify whether our findings could be accounted for by
available computational models of drug reward.
Defining ‘drug reward’: experienced utility
versus decision utility
The reported reasons for using drugs change from drug to
drug, from individual to individual, and from situation to sit-
uation (e.g., see Gossop and Connell 1975; Harford 1978).
Unsurprisingly, the drug effect that has attracted most research
interest is represented by the intense pleasure produced by the
drug such as heroin or cocaine (at least in some individuals).
However, drugs produce a myriad of other effects that can lead
an individual to use one or more of them (see, for example,
Müller and Schumann 2011). Although only in a minority of
cases the pattern of use becomes compulsive, leading to a
diagnosis of substance use disorder (SUD), drugs such as
heroin, cocaine, and alcohol are commonly referred to as ad-
dictive drugs. Unfortunately, this tends to produce a confusion
between the mechanisms responsible for the rewarding effects
of drugs and the mechanisms responsible for the loss of con-
trol over their use, that is, drug addiction. In the present paper,
we are concerned with the former rather than with the latter.
Another source of confusion is represented by the term
‘reward’. This term is used by some to indicate the
“recompense given after a particular response which rein-
forces learning or behaviour” (OED 2019). According to this
meaning, ‘reward’ is synonymous with ‘reinforcer,’which is a
purely operational term that does not require making assump-
tions about underlying psychological processes. Others use
the term reward to indicate the positive hedonic effect of re-
warding stimuli (e.g., Redish et al. 2008). Still others indicate
with the term ‘reward’ the entire set of hypothetical psycho-
logical construct(s) responsible for the rewarding effects (e.g.,
Berridge et al. 2003; Berridge 2012).1 In the present paper, we
use reward according to the last meaning, which coincides
with the notion of utility (Kahneman et al. 1997; Kahneman
1999).
Furthermore, we adopted here the distinction, proposed
independently by Berridge and colleagues (Robinson and
Berridge 1993; Berridge et al. 2009) and by Kahneman and
colleagues (Kahneman et al. 1997; Kahneman 1999), between
two main components of reward.2 Berridge and colleagues,
building on Bindra’s model of motivation (Bindra 1976), dis-
tinguished liking (pleasure/displeasure) from wanting (incen-
tive salience). Kahneman and colleagues, building on
Bentham’s economic theory of utility (Bentham 1823), distin-
guished experienced utility (a psychological construct indicat-
ing the hedonic experience) and decision utility (a computa-
tional quantity inferred from observed choices, such as pur-
chasing a good). The concepts of experienced utility and de-
cision utility appear to be germane to those of liking and
wanting, as acknowledged by Berridge and colleagues
(Zhang et al. 2009; Berridge and O’Doherty 2014).
However, Berridge’s liking and wanting indicate core motiva-
tional processes, whereas Kahneman’s experienced and deci-
sion utility are much broader concepts, including both emo-
tional and cognitive processing (see Berridge and O’Doherty
2014, pp. 341–342).
Both Berridge’s and Kahneman’s theoretical frameworks
center on the notion that the two components of reward/
utility are mediated by independent processes, and both stip-
ulate that it is conceptually wrong to automatically infer one
from the other, as they are dissociable. Some researchers have
dismissed the concepts of experienced utility based on the
assumption that subjective hedonic experience cannot be ob-
served or measured and that “choices provide all necessary
information about the utility of outcomes because rational
agents who wish to do so will optimize their hedonic experi-
ence” (Kahneman et al. 1997, p. 375). At present, this simpli-
fication is endorsed by a minority of scholars and the basic
distinction between experienced utility and decision utility has
been adopted by most researchers in the field. Yet, it is still
1 Many authors shift more or less surreptitiously from one meaning to another,
sometimes within the same paper.
2 It is beyond the scope of this review to provide a critical analysis of these
theories.
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often the case that, even in scholarly papers, affect is more or
less surreptitiously inferred from action or vice versa (for a
discussion of this issue, see Berridge 2003, p. 115). As
discussed below, experienced utility can be estimated via “ob-
jective responses (including affective behavioral reactions,
physiological autonomic, and brain limbic reactions) as well
as in humans at least, subjective feelings reported as pleasure”
(Berridge and O’Doherty 2014, p. 336).
The following sections summarize the findings of experi-
ments aimed at measuring the experienced utility and the deci-
sion utility of heroin versus cocaine in different settings in rats
and humans. By necessity, the experimental procedures used to
assess experienced drug utility in rats and humans were com-
plementary rather than identical. Whenever possible, a within-
subject design was used, to ensure that the differences observed
in the utility of heroin versus cocaine were not due to individual
variability in the response to the two drugs.
Experienced utility of heroin versus cocaine
in rats and humans
The simplest form of experienced utility is represented by in-
stant utility (“a measure of hedonic and affective experience,
which can be derived from immediate reports of current sub-
jective experience or from physiological indices”, Kahneman
et al. 1997, p. 376). However, in most cases, the hedonic expe-
rience has a temporal dimension andmight change quantitative-
ly and/or qualitatively over time, which makes it appropriate to
consider the experienced utility of temporally extended
outcomes (TEOs). The term TEO is self-explanatory, indicating
the overall utility of a series of stimuli distributed over time that
are perceived as part of the same outcome, so that “when an
evaluative summary of a temporally extended outcome is re-
quired, a representative moment that stands for the entire out-
come is selected or constructed; the temporally extended out-
come is then assigned the value of its representative moment”
(Kahneman 2000). Indeed, the experienced utility of TEOs can
be measured as total utility, calculated from the temporal profile
of instant utility or, more frequently, as remembered utility,
which encompasses the overall hedonic experience,3 and deter-
mines “whether a situation experienced in the past should now
be approached or avoided” (Kahneman et al. 1997, p. 380).
Instant utility of heroin versus cocaine in rats
Rats emit ultrasonic vocalizations (USVs) in the range of
50 kHz in response to rewarding stimuli, such as intra- and
heterospecific play (Knutson et al. 1998; Burgdorf and
Panksepp 2001; Mällo et al. 2007; Panksepp and Burgdorf
2000, 2003; Schwarting et al. 2007; Wöhr et al. 2009), sex
(McGinnis and Vakulenko 2003;White et al. 1990; Bialy et al.
2000), food (Burgdorf et al. 2000), electrical stimulation of the
medial forebrain bundle (Burgdorf et al. 2000), and addictive
drugs (Ahrens et al. 2009; Knutson et al. 1999; Natusch and
Schwarting 2010;Wintink and Brudzynski 2001;Wright et al.
2010; Barker et al. 2010; Maier et al. 2010). Based on this
evidence, it has been proposed that 50-kHz USVs reflect pos-
itive affective states in the rat (Knutson et al. 2002).4
Therefore, in the study described below (Avvisati et al.
2016), we quantified the instant utility of heroin versus co-
caine in rats by measuring the emission of 50-kHz USVs after
intravenous self-administration of either drug.
We first trained two groups of male Sprague–Dawley rats
to self-administer heroin and cocaine (on alternate days for
2 weeks) either at home or outside the home. The rats tested
at home were individually housed in standard two-lever self-
administration chambers, where they remained for the entire
duration of the experiment. The other rats were individually
housed in standard transparent plastic cages and were trans-
ferred to the self-administration chambers immediately before
the start of each testing session. Notice that throughout the
experiments, the rats were individually housed and tested in
the same dedicated testing room (thus, no transport from one
room to another and no disruption of social context or circa-
dian rhythmicity) with ad libitum access to food and water
(except during the test sessions). Thus, although the self-
administration environment was physically identical for the
two groups, one group experienced the drugs at home and
the other group outside the home.
On the last two sessions of drug-self-administration (ses-
sions 13 and 14), USVs were recorded. The same was done on
two subsequent sessions (sessions 15 and 16) during which
the rats self-administered saline solution. The number of vo-
calizations emitted during sessions 15 and 16 provided a base-
line measure incorporating both spontaneous vocalization and
conditioned vocalization in response to heroin- versus
cocaine-paired cues (i.e., cue lights, pump noise, vehicle infu-
sion). We reasoned that a net increase in 50-kHz USVs after
each infusion would be largely dependent on a positive affec-
tive state produced by the drug. Indeed, we found that the
instant utility of heroin and cocaine varied as a function of
the context of self-administration but in opposite directions.
Rats that had self-administered the drugs in their home envi-
ronment emitted more vocalizations after heroin than after
cocaine (see Fig. 1). The opposite was observed in rats that
3 Of course, in principle, there is no conceptual reason to limit the notion of
remembered utility (both in the sense of stored information and of retrospec-
tive report) to TEOs, as it might equally apply to outcomes with minimal
temporal extension (that is, to instant utility).
4 As for other putative indices of affective states in rats (e.g., hedonic facial
expression in rats, thought to express the orosensory pleasure elicited by sweet
tastes; for a review, see Berridge 2003), it is not possible to exclude that USVs
reflect instead positive motivational states.
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had self-administered the same drugs in a distinct nonhome
environment (that is, outside the home). These rats emitted
more vocalization after cocaine than after heroin. In summary,
these data appear to suggest that the instant utility of heroin is
greatest at home, whereas the instant utility of cocaine is
greatest outside the home.
Remembered utility of heroin versus cocaine
in humans
We recently completed a study (De Pirro et al. 2018), in which
we quantified the experienced utility of cocaine versus heroin
use in female and male individuals with substance use disor-
der (SUD). The participants were recruited among the clients
of a public substance misuse service affiliated to the
International Red Cross Red Crescent (Villa Maraini
Foundation, Rome, Italy), and all of them had a long history
(about 15 years on average) of both heroin and cocaine misuse
and no major psychiatric comorbidity.
As we could not record instant utility in real-world settings,
we quantified instead the remembered utility of the TEO of
drug use. As pointed out by Kahneman and colleagues
(Kahneman et al. 1997; Kahneman 1999) and by Berridge
and colleagues (Berridge and O’Doherty 2014; Berridge and
Kringelbach 2013), retrospective reports of remembered util-
ity might not provide a veridical recall of actual past pleasures,
as they might represent active mnemonic reconstructions sus-
ceptible of distortion. More reliably, remembered utility can
be measured by quantifying “affective behavioral reactions,
physiological reactions, and brain limbic reactions”
(Berridge and O’Doherty 2014, p. 336), during the recollec-
tion of past drug experiences.
Thus, in our study, we used an emotional task based on the
circumplex model of affect (Russell 1980), which posits that all
affective states arise from the interaction of two core neurobio-
logical processes: arousal (along high–low energy continuum)
and valence (along a pleasure–displeasure continuum).
Accordingly, the graphic task represented a two-dimensional
space with arousal on the vertical dimension and valence on
Fig. 1 In this within subject experiment, rats were trained to self-
administer heroin (25 μg/kg per infusion) and cocaine (400 μg/kg per
infusion), on alternate sessions, either at home or outside the home (see
text for details). The training lasted for 14 sessions. On sessions 15 and
16, the rats self-administered saline. Ultrasonic vocalizations (USVs) in
the range of 50 kHz were recorded on sessions 13–16. The graph shows
the mean net number of 50-kHz USVs emitted 10 s before and 40 s after
each of the first ten infusions of heroin and cocaine. This was done by
subtracting the number of USVs emitted before and saline self-
administration from the number of USVs emitted before and after the
corresponding drug infusion. For example, the number of vocalizations
produced before and after the first infusion of saline when the rats pressed
on the heroin-paired lever (on sessions 15 or 16) was subtracted from the
corresponding values for the first infusion of heroin (on sessions 13 or
14), and so no (for more details see Avvisati et al. 2016, Figures 7 and
8).Rats tested at home emittedmore 50-kHz USVs before and after heroin
than before and after cocaine. The opposite was observed in rats tested
outside the home. Data from Avvisati et al. (2016)
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the horizontal dimension (Fig. 2, top panels). Emoticons and
colors were added to increase the evocative power of the dia-
gram (Nathanson et al. 2016; Kaye et al. 2017). The participants
were asked to select the quadrant of the diagram that best
corresponded to the affective state experienced under the influ-
ence of heroin or cocaine. By virtue of being fast, user-friendly,
and intuitive (and dispensing altogether with verbal descrip-
tions), the task minimized the risk of cognitive distortions in
the recollection of affective states (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1997;
Kahneman 1999; Robinson and Clore 2002; Gorlin et al. 2019),
and in particular, the framing effects deriving from the partici-
pants’ negative feelings toward their own addiction (Dearing
et al. 2005; Luoma et al. 2012, 2013).
The experienced utility of heroin and cocaine in humans
varied as a function of context and also in this case in opposite
directions. The remembered utility of heroin was in fact much
greater at home than outside the home, whereas the remem-
bered utility of cocaine was greater outside the home than at
home (see Fig. 2, middle and bottom panels). To the extent
that the remembered utility of heroin and cocaine reflects the
total utility of TEO, this pattern appears to be the same as that
seen in rats.
Additional evidence that the remembered utility of heroin
and cocaine is influenced in opposite directions by the setting
of use is provided by a functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) study in which individuals with SUDwere asked to re-
Fig. 2 In this within-
subject experiment, we assessed
the affective state induced by
heroin and cocaine as reported by
individuals with addiction to both
drugs. Top-left, graphic
representation of the circumplex
model of affect (Russell 1980).
Top-right, bidimensional repre-
sentation of affective states used
developed based on the
circumplex model of affect (on
the left) by removing the labels
indicating different levels for each
dimension and by adding emoti-
cons. The middle and bottom pie
charts indicate the subjective ap-
praisal of the emotional valence
of drug experience as a function
of drug and setting. Each pie chart
represents the proportion of par-
ticipants reporting the affective
states after heroin or cocaine use,
either at home or outside the
home (see text for details). The
McNemar’s test indicated signifi-
cant shifts in valence as a function
of the setting of drug use. A small
proportion of participants report-
ed two affective states (hatched
lines) or more (gray). Data
redrawn from De Pirro et al.
(2018)
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evoke the hedonic experience of using heroin versus cocaine
at home or outside the home (De Pirro et al. 2018). In addition
to the expected changes in blood-oxygenation-level-
dependent (BOLD) signal in regions that have been previous-
ly implicated in the retrieval of memories (angular gyrus;
Bonnici et al. 2016; Kuhl and Chun 2014; Richter et al.
2016) and in mental imagery (precuneus; Fletcher et al.
1995; Richter et al. 2016), we found a double dissociation,
as a function of substance and setting, in the pattern of acti-
vation of regions implicated in brain reward (PFCx and the
striatum; Goldstein and Volkow 2002, 2011; Cox et al. 2009;
Volkow et al. 2017; Leyton and Vezina 2013) and the in con-
textualization of emotional processing (cerebellum;
Schmahmann 1996, 2004; Schmahmann and Sherman 1998;
Scheuerecker et al. 2007; Stoodley 2012; Adamaszek et al.
2014, 2017; Van Overwalle et al. 2015), that is in the fronto-
striato-cerebellar circuit (Hoshi et al. 2005; Bostan et al. 2010;
Bostan and Strick 2018).
Another interesting finding of the study by De Pirro et al.
(2018) is that the remembered utility of neither heroin nor
cocaine was ever entirely positive. Actually, in certain set-
tings, cocaine produced a mainly unpleasant affective state
in almost two thirds of users, consistent with previous reports
of cocaine-induced aversive states in both rodents and humans
(Geist and Ettenberg 1997; Ettenberg et al. 1999; Knackstedt
et al. 2002; Anthony et al. 1989; Geracioti Jr and Post 1991;
Breiter et al. 1997). Thus, the fact that a drug is willingly used
(indicating decision utility) does not necessarily imply that its
experienced utility is positive.
Decision utility of heroin versus cocaine
in rats and humans
Decision utility is “inferred from choices, either by direct
comparisons of similar objects or by indirect methods, such
as elicited willingness to pay” (Kahneman et al. 1997, pp.
376–377). In all our experiments, drug intake required ‘will-
ingness to pay’: in terms of workload in rats (except for the
noncontingent administration of drug ‘primings’), in terms of
money, or some type of barter, in humans. In some experi-
ments, there was a ‘direct comparison’ between ‘similar ob-
jects,’ that is, between heroin and cocaine. In all experiments,
the decision utility of heroin and/or cocaine was assessed in
one of two settings.
Decision utility in rats
A series of experiments (Caprioli et al. 2007a, 2008, 2009;
Celentano et al. 2009; Montanari et al. 2015; Avvisati et al.
2016; De Luca et al. 2019) were conducted in male Sprague–
Dawley rats to assess the decision utility of heroin versus
cocaine (or amphetamine). Also in these experiments, the rats
were tested either at home or outside the home. Decision util-
ity was assessed using different procedures.
1. Between-subject procedures were used to assess the rats’
willingness to pay for heroin or cocaine, as a function of
setting. In some experiments (Caprioli et al. 2007a, 2008),
the rats were given the choice between a lever that trig-
gered a drug infusion and a control lever that triggered an
infusion of vehicle, and the work necessary to obtain the
drug was increased progressively across sessions and
within session, using a break-point procedure. The rats’
decision to self-administer heroin or cocaine was influ-
enced in an opposite manner by the setting. Rats tested
at home self-administered more heroin at home than rats
tested outside the home. In contrast, the rats took more
cocaine (and amphetamine) outside the home than at
home. Furthermore, the rats worked harder for heroin at
home than outside the home and for cocaine (or amphet-
amine) outside the home than at home.
2. Within-subject procedures were used to compare the rats’
willingness to pay for heroin versus cocaine, as a function
of setting. In these experiments (Caprioli et al. 2009;
Celentano et al. 2009; Montanari et al. 2015; Avvisati
et al. 2016), the rats were trained to press on alternate days
for heroin and cocaine. One lever was paired with heroin
and the other with cocaine (in a counterbalanced fashion),
and the work necessary to obtain each drug was increased
progressively across sessions. Also, in this case, the rats’
decision was a function of context, which influenced in an
opposite manner heroin versus cocaine intake, and of
workload. The ratio of cocaine to heroin infusions was
greater outside the home than at home (indirectly indicat-
ing a preference) and became progressively larger with
the increase in workload.
3. Within-subject choice procedures were used in some stud-
ies to assess the rats’ preference for heroin or for cocaine.
To the best of our knowledge, these are the first and only
studies to have directly compared the rewarding effects of
heroin and cocaine. In one of these studies (Caprioli et al.
2009), the rats were first trained to self-administer heroin
and cocaine on alternate days, as previously described.
The rats were then given the opportunity to choose be-
tween heroin and cocaine within the same session for
several sessions. At the end of the choice sessions, the rats
were classified, using a straightforward bootstrapping
procedure (Wilson 1927; Newcombe 1988), as cocaine-
preferring, heroin-preferring, or nonpreferring. The pref-
erence for one drug or the other was influenced in
opposite directions by the context. At home, the rats
tended to prefer heroin to cocaine; outside the home, the
rats tended to prefer cocaine to heroin. Strikingly, the
same double dissociation in decision-making was ob-
served when we used an experimental design (see
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Fig. 3) in which rats were trained to receive the same drug
(heroin for some, cocaine for other rats, Figs. 3A–C, 4)
when pressing on either lever (De Luca et al. 2019). The
rats were then offered the choice between heroin and co-
caine, as described above (Fig. 3D). Also in this case, the
rats tested at home tended to prefer heroin to cocaine,
whereas the rats tested outside the home tended to prefer
cocaine to heroin (Fig. 5). In summary, drug preference
appears to be influenced to a much greater extent by the
context of drug use than by the history of drug use.
4. We also quantified the decision utility of heroin seeking
and cocaine seeking after a period of abstinence from the
drug (Montanari et al. 2015). The rats were first trained to
self-administer heroin and cocaine on alternate days (Fig.
6A–C) and then underwent an extinction procedure (Fig.
6D), during which lever pressing did not result in drug
infusion even in the presence of drug-paired cues (e.g.,
lever extension, cue lights, infusion of vehicle). The rats
were then tested in a reinstatement procedure (Fig. 6E),
developed to model relapse into drug seeking after a pe-
riod of abstinence (de Wit and Stewart 1981; Shaham
et al. 2003). The ability of a single, noncontingent intra-
venous drug infusion (drug priming) to precipitate drug
seeking was assessed by comparing lever pressing during
the reinstatement session to lever pressing under extinc-
tion conditions. Heroin priming precipitated heroin seek-
ing in rats tested at home but not in rats tested outside the
home, whereas the opposite was observed for cocaine:
cocaine priming precipitated cocaine seeking outside the
home but not at home (Fig. 7).
5. It is important to notice that rats were able to update the
decision utility of a given lever when one drug was
substituted for another. When rats that had worked more
vigorously for heroin at home than outside the home were
shifted to amphetamine self-administration (after a period
of washout), the opposite pattern was observed, as they
took more amphetamine outside the home than at home
(Caprioli et al. 2008).
In summary, all procedures indicated that the decision util-
ity of heroin is much greater at home than outside the home,
whereas the decision utility of cocaine seeking is much greater
outside the home that at home. That is, the context exerted
oppositemodulatory influence on the decision utility of heroin
versus cocaine.
Decision utility in humans
The participants in these experiments were female and male
clients of Villa Maraini with a long history of both heroin and
cocaine misuse (Caprioli et al. 2009; Badiani and Spagnolo
2013). The participants were asked to report on the preferred
setting of heroin versus cocaine use. The majority of partici-
pants reported to use heroin mainly at home but cocaine mainly
outside the home. That is, setting preferences for heroin were
opposite to those for cocaine. It should be noticed that setting
preferences were not the result of practical constraints, as iden-
tical patterns were observed in individuals using the same route
of administration (intravenous injection, insufflation, or inhala-
tion) for both drugs (Badiani and Spagnolo 2013). It is also
important to point out that in most cases cocaine and heroin
co-abusers prefer to use the two drugs independently (e.g., Leri
et al. 1994; Badiani and Spagnolo 2013). Badiani and Spagnolo
(2013) found that only 11% of a population of drug users (also
recruited among the clients of VillaMaraini) used ‘speedball’ (a
slang term indicating the use of the two drugs at the same time
or in close temporal sequence) at one time or another.
Why does the context influence in opposite
directions the experienced utility
and decision utility of heroin versus cocaine?
The findings summarized above were initially a source of
surprise to us, as they were at odds with the results of previous
work concerned with drug-induced psychomotor sensitiza-
tion, which is thought to reflect the sensitization of
mesolimbic dopaminergic transmission (Robinson and
Berridge 1993). Indeed, these earlier studies had shown that
the magnitude of psychomotor sensitization to both
psychostimulants (cocaine and amphetamine) and opioids
(morphine and heroin) is increased when these drugs are ad-
ministered outside the home relative to when they are admin-
istered at home (Badiani et al. 1995a, b, c, 1997, 2000;
Browman et al. 1998a, b; Crombag et al. 1996, 2000; Fraioli
et al. 1999; Ostrander et al. 2003; Paolone et al. 2003, 2007).
The fact that the modulatory influence of environment on
psychomotor sensitization did not vary as a function of drug
class was fully consistent with theoretical models centered on
the notion that dopaminergic transmission represents the
shared substrate of action for addictive drugs (e.g., Wise and
Bozarth 1987; Robinson and Berridge 1993; Nestler 2004;
Covey et al. 2014; Volkow et al. 2017). The ability of context
to influence in opposite directions both experienced and deci-
sion utility of heroin versus cocaine not only indicates a fun-
damental dissociation between drug-induced psychomotor
sensitization and drug utility, but also calls for a theoretical
model that dispenses with unitary notions of drug reward.
We have proposed that any suchmodel must consider: (1) the
complexity of central and peripheral actions of drugs, indepen-
dent of their euphorigenic effects; and (2) the fact that drug
effects do not develop in a psychophysiological vacuum. In
particular, we have proposed an emotional appraisal model of
drug reward, according to which the setting of drug use provides
an ‘ecological backdrop’ against which the central and
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peripheral effects of drugs are appraised (Badiani 2013). This
idea builds on Bindra’s emphasis on stimulus configurations as
the critical motivational drivers of behavior (e.g., “Movements
are instigated not by target stimulus features alone but by target
stimulus features embedded in proper background stimulus con-
texts”; Bindra 1976, pp. 59–60).We have extended the notion of
background to include drug effects different from the rewarding
effects (the target stimulus features).
The central idea of our model is that under certain conditions,
there is mismatch between some of the effects of the drug and
background information. Cocaine, for example, produces a state
of arousal by activating central noradrenergic transmission and
increases heart and respiratory rate by activating the sympathetic
nervous system (Billman 1995; Sofuoglu and Sewell 2009;
Maceira et al. 2014). In contrast, heroin depresses the central
nervous system and produces parasympathomimetic effects,
including the bradycardia (Haddad and Lasala 1987; Thornhill
et al. 1989; Nilsson et al. 2016). Although these ‘noneuphoriant’
effects of drugs are usually neglected by theoretical frameworks
of drug reward, it is obvious that they represent a set of intero-
ceptive stimuli that overlap in time not onlywith ‘drug euphoria’
but also with incoming environmental stimuli. This gives rise to
the possibility of a mismatch between interoceptive and extero-
ceptive information. When cocaine is taken at home, for exam-
ple, interoceptive information signals a state of arousal, whereas
exteroceptive information signals a quiet, safe environment,
hence amismatch (henceforth, this termwill be used exclusively
to indicate interoceptive/exteroceptive mismatch). A mismatch
might also occur when heroin is taken outside the home, given
that the interoceptive information signaling a state of sedation
and relaxation conflicts with exteroceptive information signaling
exciting, potentially dangerous contexts. We have proposed that
Fig. 3 Experimental design of a within-subject study concerned with
heroin versus cocaine choice in rats. A-C The rats were first trained to
self-administer heroin (25μg/kg per infusion) and cocaine (400μg/kg per
infusion), on alternate sessions, either at home or outside the home. The
training lasted for 12 sessions (see Fig. 4 for results). D The rats were then
given the opportunity to choose between heroin and cocaine for seven
consecutive sessions. At the end of the choice sessions, the rats were
classified as cocaine-preferring, heroin-preferring, or nonpreferring (see
Fig. 5 for results). Modified from De Luca et al. (2019)
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in the presence of suchmismatches, the experienced utility (both
instant and remembered utility) of drugs would be reduced,
relative to conditions in which there was no such a mismatch
(Badiani 2013). The change in remembered utility would be
reflected in a parallel change in decision utility.
Interestingly, in the study by Badiani and Spagnolo (2013),
the rationale provided by the small subset of participants using
heroin in combination with (or more often after) cocaine was
to minimize the anxiogenic effect of cocaine. Consistent with
our hypothesis, this occurred more frequently at home (where
the anxiogenic effect would be more unpleasant): speedball
was used at home in 59.1% of cases and outside the home in
31.8% of cases (in 9.1% of cases, there was no preference for
one setting or the other).
The results of studies with other classes of drugs having
sedative effects, such as alcohol, or activating effects, such as
ketamine, are consistent with our hypothesis. Most heavy
drinkers (Nyaronga et al. 2009) and rats (Testa et al. 2011)
prefer in fact drinking at home rather than outside the home. In
contrast, both humans (De Luca et al. 2012) and rats (De Luca
and Badiani 2011) prefer using ketamine (which has
sympathomimetic effects; Bevan et al. 1997) outside the home
rather than at home.
In the next section, we will discuss in what way amismatch
might affect the rewarding effects of heroin and cocaine.
Implications for computational neuroscience
Can available computational models of drug reward5 account
for the findings reviewed here? A necessary premise for any
5 Notice that models of reward are relevant to drug reward only to the extent
that they can account for the specific mechanisms of action of drugs.
Fig. 4 Rats were tested as
described in Fig. 3A–C. Mean
(±SEM) number of infusions
during the training phase for the
heroin- and cocaine-trained
groups, as a function of setting,
time-out (TO) period, maximum
number of infusions, and fixed
ratio (FR). Single and double as-
terisks indicate significant effect
setting (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, re-
spectively). Consistent with pre-
vious findings (Caprioli et al.
2007a, 2008) and despite the
constraints in the maximum
number of infusions, rats at home
self-administered more heroin
than rats outside the home,
whereas rats outside the home
self-administered more cocaine
than rats at home. Modified from
De Luca et al. (2019)
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answer to this question is that computational models of drug
reward must be kept distinct from computational models of
drug addiction (e.g., Redish et al. 2008; Keiflin and Janak
2015), which deal with the loss of control over drug use. It
is also important to distinguish computational models of drug
reward from computational models of reward-related
learning. As noted by Berridge et al. (2008), “Current com-
putational models predict reward based solely on learning.
Real motivation involves that but also more.” Given the def-
inition of reward provided in the early sections of this paper,
we are interested in models that include “explicit representa-
tion or cognitive model of the UCS and their place in the
world” (Berridge 2012, p. 1127).
Clearly, all models of drug reward based on the notion that
the experienced utility and/or the decision utility of all addic-
tive drugs depends on unitary mechanisms of action cannot
explain the findings reviewed here. For example, models that
posit that the rewarding effects all substances of abuse depend
entirely on the facilitation of dopamine transmission (e.g.,
Keiflin and Janak 2015) can hardly explain why heroin and
cocaine should be appraised so differently by rats and humans.
Finally, to account for our findings, a model must include a
component that could mediate the substance-specific influ-
ence of setting on drug reward. To the best of our knowledge,
there are only two models that, with some tweaking, might
accommodate for this last requirement.
The first of these models is that originally proposed by
Robinson and Berridge (1993). A formal computational ver-
sion of (the incentive salience component of) this model was
later proposed by Zhang, Berridge, and colleagues (Zhang
et al. 2009; Dayan and Berridge 2014). As the researchers
who proposed this model were based at the University of
Michigan, this model will be referred to as the Michigan mod-
el (see Fig. 8). More recently, Keramati and colleagues
(Keramati and Gutkin 2014) proposed a computational model
of homeostatically regulated reinforcement learning (HRRL),
which, according to the authors represents a “normative gen-
eralization” of the Zhang’s equation (Keramati et al. 2017, p.
149). However, the HRRL model is based on the notion of
drive reduction that the Michigan model emphatically rejects
(Berridge 2004). While the Michigan model clearly predicts
that the ‘value’ of a UCS depends on its hedonic effect (➔
remembered utility), the Keramati/Gutkin’s model posits that
it reduces a pre-existing homeostatic ‘need.’ In the case of the
early encounters with a drug, it is not clear what exactly that
need might be. Thus, we will not consider this model further.
The main feature of the Michigan model is that it includes
separate processing systems for incentive salience attributor
➔ ‘wanting’ (i.e., ‘pure’ decision utility6) and for a pleasure
integrator ➔ ‘liking’ (i.e., experienced utility). Zhang,
Berridge, and colleagues (Zhang et al. 2009) proposed a com-
putational version of the incentive salience attributor. Zhang’s
equation includes r, a learned cache value of the experienced
utility (that is, remembered utility) of unconditioned, or un-
conditional, stimuli (UCSs),7 which becomes associated with
the stimulus features of the UCS and of conditioned, or con-
ditional, stimuli (CSs), through a process of incentive learn-
ing. On subsequent encounters, UCS/CS will directly activate
the incentive salience attributor eliciting ‘wanting.’ It must be
stressed that although the authors of the Michigan model have
placed particular emphasis on postlearning components of
Pavlovian motivation, from a formal point of view, the model
does not distinguish between CSs and UCSs if not for the
ability of the latter to directly access the pleasure integrator.
The gain of the incentive salience attributor (as well as of
the ‘pleasure integrator’) can be raised or decreased by dy-
namic fluctuations in neurobiological states that are relevant to
the motivational value of a given UCS/CS (e.g., physiological
drives, such as hyper-/dehydration or hunger/satiety, or phar-
macological manipulations that impinge directly onto the ma-
chinery of the two processing systems). These modulatory
influences, which do not require new learning, are represented
by the gating parameter κ, which serves a purely computa-
tional function, as it mediates incoming information of the
most disparate nature. The final decision utility of the UCS/
CS is represented by Ṽ. The decision utility of a stimulus S at
time t is: Ṽ(St) = rt × κ + γV(St + 1), where γ is a temporal dis-
count factor. Hence, in the case of heroin or heroin cues (H) at
time t, Ṽ(Ht) = rt × κ + γV(Ht + 1).
The most ‘robust’ component of the Michigan model is the
incentive salience attributor. Its core neurobiological substrate
is represented by the mesolimbic dopaminergic system and
6 Which is a prepotent psychological process much more relevant to the com-
pulsive nature of drug taking than higher order cognitive forms of decision-
making (wanting in the ordinary sense of the word, according to Berridge and
O’Doherty 2014, p. 341).
7 Notice that Ivan Pavlov coined the term “conditioned reflexes to distinguish
them from the inborn or unconditioned reflexes,”which are “already complet-
ed at birth” (Pavolov 1927, p. 25). That is, an UCS should be able to trigger a
response before previous learning, as opposed to CSs. However, as pointed out
by Hilgard and Marquis (1961), very soon the term UCS came to be used
operationally to indicate “a stimulus that, at the outset of an experiment [em-
phasis by the authors], evokes a regular and measurable response”. Hilgard
and Marquis, went on “mentioning specifically that the unconditioned re-
sponse is not necessarily an unlearned or reflex response to the UCS. In many
cases, such as salivation to food placed in the mouth, it is; but in other cases,
such as salivation at sight of smell and food in the distance, which Pavlov also
used as UCS, it is not.” Thus, a distinction must be made between Pavlov’s
original definition of UCSs (which have ‘inborn’ ability to evoke a response)
and the operational definition of UCS in the context of conditioning proce-
dures (including Pavlov’s). Theorists interested in explaining real-world phe-
nomena are concerned with the notion of UCS and CS encapsulated by
Pavlov’s original definition. Thus, in the context of the Michigan model, a
true UCS must have hardwired intrinsic ability to impinge on the pleasure
integrator and/or on the incentive salience attributor. In considering the latter
possibility, Berridge noted that “it is possible to imagine inserting a UCS value
such as, say,Ut value (Ut for unconditioned UCS attractive features) as level of
innate attractiveness in place of the learned cache rt value” (Berridge 2012, p.
1271).
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related circuitry. This system, besides encoding the learned mo-
tivational salience of UCS/CS, represents a direct target for
drugs that modulate dopaminergic transmission (Berridge
2012). Indeed, it has been proposed that all addictive drugs
can directly elicit wanting, by activating dopaminergic trans-
mission, in the absence of pleasure, that is, with little or no
experienced utility (Robinson and Berridge 1993).
Furthermore, by repeatedly activating dopaminergic transmis-
sion, addictive drugs can sensitize this system and amplify the
response of the incentive salience attributor to drugs and drug-
paired cues.
In contrast, the exact nature of the ‘pleasure integrator’ of the
Michigan model is more nebulous. Work done by Berridge and
colleagues suggests that orosensory pleasure elicited by sweet
tastes is processed by a distributed system including a number
of interconnected ‘hedonic hotpots’ (for a review, see Berridge
2012). To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence that
the same network of ‘hedonic hotspots’ is also responsible for
the computation of the hedonic effects of drugs (and in partic-
ular of psychostimulant drugs) in rats. It is fair to say the exis-
tence of a ‘common neurobiological currency’ of experienced
utility is mostly predicated on correlational data from heteroge-
neous neuroimaging studies in humans (for a review, see
Berridge and Kringelbach 2013), the interpretation of which
is to say the least problematic, owing not only to the intrinsic
limitations of imaging techniques but also to the reliance on the
response to cues instead than on actual hedonic experiences.
Other features of the ‘pleasure integrator’ are less than
clear. It is not clear, for example, what type of drug effects is
processed by the integrator to compute overall experienced
utility. Does the ‘pleasure integrator’ compute only the instant
utility of rapid surges of drug concentration in the brain, such
as the intense, orgasmic euphoria produced by intravenous
injections of heroin or cocaine or the ‘buzz’ produced by a
puff of tobacco smoking? Or it does it also compute the ex-
perienced utility of the TEO of drug use, which depends on a
number of neurobiological processes independent of eupho-
ria? For instance, are the feeling of contentment (well-being)
and the sedative, benumbing, anxiolytic, and analgesic effects
of heroin (Jaffe et al. 1997) processed by the same ‘pleasure
integrator’ responsible for the immediate euphorigenic effect?
Is it possible that distinct integrators process discrete types of
heroin utility (e.g., euphoria, contentment, sedation,
benumbment, anxiolysis, analgesia), which are then
compounded into a common neurobiological currency of re-
membered experienced utility? And finally, how many ‘plea-
sure integrators’ are there? Is there a single ‘pleasure integra-
tor’ for all addictive drugs or are there many? Notice that
although these issues remain to be addressed, they do not
challenge the fundamental structure of the Michigan model.
Thus, to simplify the discussion in the following paragraphs,
we will provisionally assume that a single integrator computes
all drug effects relevant to the hedonic experience. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to consider alternative possibilities.
Fig. 5 Rats were tested as described in Fig. 3D. Drug preferences in
individual rats (calculated using bootstrapping analysis), as a function
of setting and drug history (see text for details). The preference for one
drug or the other was influenced in opposite directions by the context. At
home, 57.7% rats preferred heroin to cocaine, whereas only 23.1%
preferred cocaine to heroin. Outside the home, 60% rats preferred
cocaine to heroin, whereas only 16.7% preferred heroin to cocaine.
Some rats (19.2% at home and 23.3% outside the home) did not exhibit
a significant preference for either drug. Modified from De Luca et al.
(2019)
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Finally, from a conceptual point of view, the Michigan
model can easily accommodate the existence of distinct ‘κ
spaces’ qualitatively unique to the appropriate UCS, each
able to modulate in a specific manner only the response to
its own UCS and related CSs. Thus, it would be reasonable
to assume the existence of distinct κ spaces for heroin and
cocaine. The Zhang’s equation, however, does not offer a
formal computational version of these multiple κ spaces,
and the authors acknowledge this limitation of the model
(Zhang et al. 2009, p. 12).
Does the Michigan model agree with the results of the rat’s
studies reviewed in the previous sections and with our work-
ing hypothesis? The following analysis makes two working
assumptions. First, we will assume that in a virtual landscape
without κ space(s), the cache values for the doses of heroin
(25 μg/kg) and cocaine (400 μg/kg) used in our comparative
experiments (Caprioli et al. 2009; Celentano et al. 2009;
Avvisati et al. 2016; De Luca et al. 2019) are the same. This
assumption seems reasonable not only because these doses
were selected on the basis of dose–effect curves (Caprioli
et al. 2007a, 2008) but because, as shown in Fig. 5, when
the groups at home and outside the home are collapsed, ap-
proximately the same proportion of rats chooses heroin and
cocaine (36 and 43%, respectively). The second working as-
sumption is that there are distinct κ spaces for heroin and
cocaine.
We will first consider experienced utility and then decision
utility.
Fig. 6 Experimental design aimed at quantifying the decision utility of
heroin seeking and cocaine seeking after a period of abstinence from the
drug (Montanari et al. 2015). The rats were first trained to self-administer
heroin and cocaine on alternate days (A–C) and then underwent an ex-
tinction procedure (D), during which lever pressing did not result in drug
infusion even in the presence of drug-paired cues (e.g., lever extension,
cue lights, infusion of vehicle). The rats were then tested in a reinstate-
ment procedure (E), developed to model relapse into drug seeking after a
period of abstinence. The ability of a single, noncontingent intravenous
drug infusion (drug priming) to precipitate drug seeking was assessed by
comparing lever pressing during the reinstatement session to lever press-
ing under extinction conditions (for results, see Fig. 7)
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Parameter κ and experienced utility
Although the Zhang’s equation is concerned exclusively with
the attribution of incentive salience, it is clear that the
Michigan model can easily predict greater utility of heroin at
home than outside the home and vice versa for cocaine (see
Figure 2 in Robinson and Berridge 1993 and Figure 1 in
Berridge 2012). It is sufficient to postulate that interoceptive
Fig. 7 Mean (±SEM) number of
lever presses during the first hour
of the last extinction session
(white bars) versus the
reinstatement session (black bars)
for rats tested at home versus rats
outside the home (see Fig. 6). At
the beginning of the reinstatement
session, independent groups of
rats (N values are indicated by the
numbers within the white bars)
received noncontingent intrave-
nous (i.v.) infusions of one of
three doses of cocaine (top
panels) or heroin (bottom panels).
Significant (##p ≤ 0.01 and
####p ≤ 0.0001) main effect of
priming. Data from Montanari
et al. (2015)
Fig. 8 Schematic representation
of the Michigan model (Robinson
and Berridge 1993; Berridge
2012). Not all features of the
model are reproduced here (e.g.,
reboosting). The computational
version of the incentive salience
component of the model (Zhang
et al. 2009) calculates the decision
utility of a stimulus S at time t
with the formula: Ṽ(St) = rt x κ +
γV(St+1), where γ is a temporal
discount factor. See text for
details
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and exteroceptive information impinge onto the integrator via
the parameter κ. The κ value for heroin (κH), for example,
would take different values depending on whether a mismatch
is absent (κH,no-mismatch = 1) or present (κH,mismatch < 1). It fol-
lows that the ‘pleasure integrator’ will yield greater liking for
heroin at home then outside the home, and greater liking for
cocaine outside the home then at home. These differences in
experienced utility will translate into parallel differences in the
remembered utility (r) of heroin versus cocaine cues. We have
seen in a previous section that the activity of a fronto-striato-
cerebellar network mirrors the changes in the remembered
utility of heroin versus cocaine, as a function of setting, in
drug users (De Pirro et al. 2018). It is too early to speculate
whether this network might serve as a ‘pleasure integrator’ or
simply encode the parameter κ.
Parameter κ and decision utility
As stated above, the differences in the experienced utility of
heroin and cocaine as a function of setting will translate in
differences in the cache value r of the respective UCS/CS
leading to difference in V. These differences will be further
magnified at the level of decision utility owing again to pa-
rameter κ. Indeed, the incentive salience attributor will yield
V = 1when κno-mismatch = 1, and V < 1 when κmismatch < 1. This
would explain why the rats self-administered and worked
harder for heroin at home than outside the home and vice versa
for cocaine during the acquisition of drug self-administration
(Caprioli et al. 2007a; De Luca et al. 2019; see Fig. 4).
In contrast, in the choice sessions illustrated in Figs. 3D, 5,
the rats were confronted with a completely new situation rel-
ative to the acquisition phase. During the acquisition phase
(Fig. 3A–C), the rats received the same drug (heroin or co-
caine) by pressing on alternate sessions on the left or the right
lever (De Luca et al. 2019). Clearly, by the end of training, the
decision utility of the two levers was identical. During the
choice session, both levers were made available simultaneous-
ly, but one was paired with heroin and the other with cocaine.
Depending on the setting, the rats tended to prefer heroin to
cocaine (at home) or cocaine to heroin (outside the home),
indicating a shift in the decision utility of the two levers.
One obvious possibility is that the change in experienced
utility leads to a re-evaluation of the CS (lever+cues) and a
new r value, which implies new learning. Alternatively, can
the Zhang’s equation account for the change in decision utility
for the two levers, independent of new learning? Apparently
yes, if, as already discussed, there are no intrinsic qualitative or
quantitative differences in the experienced utility of a single
dose of heroin or cocaine.8 For example, during training with
cocaine outside the home, κC,no-mismatch = 1 and V = 1 for both
levers. When, during the choice phase the rat (purely by
chance) completes the task on the lever that now triggers an
infusion of heroin, the equation will yield V < 1 because of
κH,mismatch < 1, whereas the decision utility of the cocaine-
paired lever remains the same (V = 1). Thus, rats outside the
home will tend to choose cocaine over heroin. The opposite
will occur in rats trained with cocaine at home. In this case,
during training, κmismatch < 1 and V < 1 for both levers, but dur-
ing the choice phase, the decision utility of the lever paired with
heroin will increase (κH,no-mismatch = 1 and V = 1). Thus, rats at
homewill tend to prefer heroin over cocaine. In summary, in the
words of Zhang and colleagues (Zhang et al. 2009, p. 5), it
appears that “specific κ’s determine what to ‘want’.”
Finally, we will consider the ability of Zhang’s equation to
account for the opposite modulatory influence of setting on
the ‘priming’ effect of heroin versus cocaine in rat model of
relapse, as previously described (see Fig. 7). In this experi-
ment non-contingent doses of heroin or cocaine were admin-
istered to rats after an extinction phase, during which they
were repeatedly given access to the CS (cue lights, lever ex-
tension, vehicle infusion) but not to the UCS (the drug).
Berridge and colleagues (Robinson and Berridge 1993;
Berridge 2012) have proposed that operant conditioned be-
havior requires ‘reboosting’ of ‘wanting,’ which serves as
“an incremental mechanism of incentive salience mainte-
nance” occurring at each CS–UCS rewarded trial. In the ab-
sence of the UCS, ‘deboosting’ of incentive salience occurs,
leading to a progressive decrement in responding (but never to
its complete disappearance). However, responding might re-
sume under extinction conditions—that is, during unrewarded
trials—if a small ‘priming’ dose of the drug is administered at
the start of the session (Robinson and Berridge 1993; Berridge
2012). The priming effects of drug are included in the param-
eter κ, thus representing a special case of what has been
discussed in the previous paragraphs: κno-mismatch = 1 and
V = 1 for heroin priming at home and cocaine priming outside
the home versus κmismatch < 1 and V < 1 for heroin priming
outside the home and cocaine priming at home.
Dopamine and incentive salience attribution
As discussed in the previous sections, from a purely concep-
tual point of view, the Michigan model seems robust enough
to handle the substance specificity of environmental influ-
ences on both experienced utility and decision utility.
However, some difficulties arise when the neurobiological
nature of the Michigan model is considered. We will focus
here first on parameter κ and then on the role of the
mesolimbic dopaminergic system as the core mechanism of
incentive salience attribution.
Parameter κ and dopamine
Although Zhang, Berridge, and colleagues (Zhang et al. 2009;
Berridge 2012; Berridge and O’Doherty 2014) have made it
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sufficiently clear that the parameter κ is a purely computation-
al device, it remains to be explained what type of neurobio-
logical mechanisms are responsible for gating the activity of
the incentive salience attributor. It is possible to distinguish
proximal and distal components of parameter κ. The
Michigan model clearly posits that the proximal mechanism
is represented by fluctuations of dopamine levels. The distal
mechanisms must necessarily change depending on the nature
of the relevant brain state. Berridge (2012), for example, has
discussed in detail the neurobiological mechanisms responsi-
ble for the modulatory influences of natural appetites and sa-
tiety on the response to orosensory stimuli. Here, we are con-
cerned only with the mechanisms implicated in the effect of
heroin versus cocaine primings and of interoceptive/
exteroceptive mismatches.
In the case of drug priming, we are dealing with the sim-
plest version of parameter κ, as in this case there are no distal
mechanisms: drugs simply plug into the incentive salience
attributor by activating dopaminergic transmission. Indeed,
the Michigan model attributes the ability of drug primings to
reboost the incentive salience attributor to the activation of
dopaminergic transmission (Robinson and Berridge 1993;
Berridge 2012). It is commonly assumed that all substances
of abuse increase dopaminergic transmission (e.g., Di Chiara
and Imperato 1988; Covey et al. 2014), albeit via different
mechanisms of action. Cocaine induces dopamine overflow
in the terminal regions of mesotelencephalic dopaminergic
system by blocking the dopamine-reuptake transporter (for
reviews, see Johanson and Fischman 1989; Kuczenski et al.
1982). Heroin is thought to increase dopaminergic concentra-
tions in the same regions indirectly by binding mu-opioid
receptors (MOR) in the ventral tegmental area and substantia
nigra, hence disinhibiting dopamine-releasing neurons
(Gysling and Wang 1983; Matthews and German 1984;
Johnson and North 1992), and by increasing the amplitude
of phasic relative to tonic dopamine signals (Britt and
McGehee 2008). Microdialysis experiments have consistently
shown that noncontingent administration of cocaine or, to a
lesser extent, of heroin increases extracellular dopamine con-
centrations over a time scale of several minutes (e.g., Hemby
et al. 1995; Marinelli et al. 1998; Pattison et al. 2011, 2012;
Gottås et al. 2014). Less clear-cut are the microdialysis data
concerning the changes in dopamine concentrations during
self-administration. In the case of heroin, for example, some
studies reported modest increases in dopamine (e.g., Wise
et al. 1995) and others did not (Hemby et al. 1995).
Most relevant to understand the direct effects of self-
administered drugs on dopamine transmission are the studies
using voltammetric methodology, which monitor
dopaminergic activity on a second or subsecond scale. These
studies have shown that in rats self-administering cocaine or
heroin, the dopamine signal decreases sharply immediately
after the delivery of either drug, but not after a sham vehicle
infusion (Gratton and Wise 1994; Kiyatkin 1995; Gratton
1996; Stuber et al. 2005; Cameron et al. 2014). A similar
decrease is produced by single passive infusions of similar
doses of heroin or cocaine, like in the case of the priming
inject ions used in our experiments (see Fig. 5) .
Electrophysiology studies support the findings from voltamm-
etry experiments. Kiyatkin and Rebec (1997), for example,
monitored the activity of presumed dopamine neurons in the
ventral tegmental area during heroin self-administration and
found “a transient inhibition of DA activity correlated with
heroin reward” followed by DA activation during “heroin-
seeking behavior.” The finding of the studies cited above are
not seriously challenged by the claims of increased dopamine
activity produced by cocaine self-administration (e.g., Phillips
et al. 2003; Aragona et al. 2009; Willuhn et al. 2011). In these
studies, the infusion (over a period 3–6 s) is paired with ex-
posure to conditioned stimuli with much longer duration
(20 s). This makes it impossible to distinguish the relative
contribution of UCS versus CS (see Rescorla 1967).
Furthermore, the increase in dopamine begins almost imme-
diately after exposure to the UCS/CS and lasts only a few
seconds, which is not compatible with the pharmacodynamics
of drug actions in the CNS, whereas it is perfectly in sync with
the physiology of cue reactivity. In summary, the immediate
effect of addictive drugs on dopaminergic activity does not
appear to be consistent with the notion that the modulatory
influence of parameter κ is necessarily mediated by an in-
crease in dopaminergic transmission.
The possible neurobiological mechanisms responsible for the
blunting influence of mismatch on decision utility of heroin and
cocaine are much more complex and have been the object of a
detailed discussion in an earlier paper (Badiani 2013). Briefly,
we proposed that the basolateral amygdala (BLA), which plays
a central role in the emotional appraisal of interoceptive and
exteroceptive stimuli (including central and peripheral drug ef-
fects, such as changes in heart rate and respiratory rate), is cru-
cially positioned to detect eventual affective mismatches (Sah
et al. 2003; McGaugh 2004; Salzman and Fusi 2010; Murray
2007; Tamietto and de Gelder 2010; Critchley and Harrison
2013). The BLA can then transfer this information to the brain
regions that directly control goal-directed behavior, such as the
striatal complex and prefrontal cortex (Murray 2007). Studies
using in situ hybridization of c-fos mRNA as an index of neu-
ronal activation in the rat brain lend some support to this hy-
pothesis (Day et al. 2001). Cocaine and amphetamine produce
in fact much greater activation of the BLA when administered
outside the home (no mismatch) than when administered at
home (mismatch). A similar pattern was observed in the dorsal
striatum and in the nucleus accumbens (Badiani et al. 1998;
Uslaner et al. 2001a; Ostrander et al. 2003; Hope et al. 1992).
In contrast, the setting appears to modulate in a very different,
sometimes opposite, manner the effects of opioids, such as mor-
phine and heroin (Ferguson et al. 2004; Paolone et al. 2007;
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Celentano et al. 2009). Particularly relevant here is finding that,
within the striatum, cocaine and amphetamine increases the ac-
tivity of theD2+/enkephalin+medium spiny neurons (MSNs) to
a much greater extent when administered outside the home than
when administered at home (Badiani et al. 1999; Uslaner et al.
2001b), whereas the opposite occurs with morphine (Ferguson
et al. 2004). In turnD2+/enkephalin+MSNs indirectly disinhibit
the subthalamic nucleus, which has been implicated in reward
and decision-making (Zénon et al. 2016; Pelloux et al. 2018).
These data provide a tentative set of distal mechanism respon-
sible for the opposite influence of setting on the decision utility
of opioids versus psychostimulant drugs. Even in this case, there
is some reason to doubt that the proximal mechanism is repre-
sented by dopaminergic transmission. Microdialysis experi-
ments, conducted in parallel with the in situ hybridization ex-
periments reviewed above, have shown virtually no difference
in amphetamine-induced dopamine overflow in the nucleus ac-
cumbens core and shell and other subregions of the striatal com-
plex of rats tested at home versus rats tested outside the home
(Badiani et al. 1998, 2000). Taken together, these findings seem
to suggest that at least some of the inputs included in parameter
κ might modulate decision utility downstream from dopamine
transmission.
Decision utility ‘wanting’ and dopamine
The voltammetry studies cited in the previous section have
shown that the dopamine signal progressively increases at the
presentation of the CS marking the onset of each trial of cocaine
(Gratton and Wise 1994; Gratton 1996) or heroin (Kiyatkin
1995) availability. This and other evidence support the notion
that dopamine encodes either a prediction error signal or the
incentive salience properties of drug-paired cues (e.g., Schultz
et al. 1993; Montague et al. 1996; Berridge 2007; Flagel et al.
2011; for a broader discussion of the role of dopamine in
learning and motivation see Berke 2018). Yet, it is not clear to
what extent this contributes to the decision utility of drugs.
Comparative studies have shown that the while the reinforcing
effects of cocaine are greatly reduced by lesions of the dopami-
nergic system, by dopamine receptor antagonists, or by RNA
interference of dopamine D1 receptors, this is not the case for
heroin (Ettenberg et al. 1982; Pettit et al. 1984; Gerrits et al.
1994; Gerrits and Van Ree 1996; Pisanu et al. 2015). Thus, even
though, as mentioned previously, noncontingent administrations
of heroin can produce negligible to modest increases in dopa-
mine concentrations in the nucleus accumbens, as measured via
microdialysis, it is unlikely that this contributes in a significant
manner to its decision utility. In this respect, it is remarkable that
the reinforcing effects of opioid receptor agonists do not corre-
late at all with their ability to increase dopaminergic concentra-
tions, as measured by microdialysis. The reinforcing effect of 6-
acetylmorphine (an active metabolite of heroin), for example, is
comparable to that of heroin (Avvisati et al. 2018) even though
the former induces much greater and faster dopamine increases
than the latter (Gottås et al. 2014). Even more striking is the fact
that the selective kappa-opioid agonist RU 51599 has greater
reinforcing effect than heroin (at low but not at high workload)
even though it greatly decreases dopamine concentrations in the
nucleus accumbens (Marinelli et al. 1998).
Conclusions
We have reviewed here a series of translational studies dem-
onstrating that the experienced utility and decision utility of
heroin and cocaine are modulated in opposite direction by the
circumstances of drug use. This confirms the importance of
settings in modulating drug reward (see Zinberg 1984;
Crombag and Shaham 2002; Caprioli et al. 2007b; Ahmed
et al. 2018) and challenges prevailing unitary theories of drug
reward and drug addiction (Badiani et al. 2011; Badiani et al.
2018; Badiani 2013). Of course, the differences between the
rewarding effects of heroin and cocaine (not to mention other
addictive drugs) go well beyond those observed under the
influence of environmental context (for reviews, see Caprioli
et al. 2007b; Redish et al. 2008; Ikemoto 2010; Badiani et al.
2011, 2018; Peters et al. 2013; Nutt et al. 2015).
Most important, our findings and much of the evidence
concerning the role of dopamine in heroin reward (Ettenberg
et al. 1982; Pettit et al. 1984; Gerrits et al. 1994; Gerrits and Van
Ree 1996; Pisanu et al. 2015) appear to challenge the notion
that mesolimbic dopamine transmission encodes the final deci-
sion utility of all addictive drugs, which underpins most model
of drug reward (e.g., Wise 1980; Wise and Bozarth 1987;
Nestler 2001, 2004; Sulzer 2011; Covey et al. 2014; Keiflin
and Janak 2015; Volkow andMorales 1995). Thus, our findings
have implications for the development of robust, context-sensi-
tive, computational models of drug reward.
It appears of the extant models that none is fully compatible
with the results discussed above. However, we have shown
that with some tweaking the architecture of the Michigan
model (Robinson and Berridge 1993; Berridge 2012) and its
computational version (Zhang et al. 2009; Dayan and
Berridge 2014) can accommodate most of our findings, except
for the critical role that this model attributes to dopamine. In
this respect, however, it is worth noticing that in the graphic
representations of the Michigan model, no specific neurobio-
logical label is attached to its components, including the in-
centive salience attributor (e.g., Figure 2 in Robinson and
Berridge 1993, and Figure 1 in Berridge 2012; but see
Figure 1 in Berridge and Robinson 2016). More explicitly,
in the original formulation of their model, Robinson and
Berridge (1993) stated (note 4, p. 275): “Regardless, we want
to emphasize that the Incentive-Sensitization Theory of
Addiction does not require that the sole or even primary site
of drug-induced neuroadaptations responsible for craving
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specifically be on dopamine neurons. If it is not, then our
assignment of sensitization of incentive salience to dopamine
would be incorrect. Nevertheless, the concept that drug crav-
ing develops because of sensitization of incentive salience
could still be fundamentally correct, but it would be mediated
by another, as yet unidentified neural substrate.” It is fair to
say, however, that in their papers, Robinson and Berridge
place such an emphasis on the central role of the dopaminergic
system (e.g., “Berridge’s Incentive Salience Theory:
Dopamine as Pure Decision Utility” in Berridge and
O’Doherty 2014, p. 341) that it becomes difficult to separate
dopamine from the incentive salience attributor. Similar con-
siderations can be made for the role of dopamine in mediating
the influence of parameter κ on the incentive salience
attributor (see Zhang et al. 2009; Berridge 2012).
Whether the Michigan model can be further developed to
overcome these apparent limitations (as well as the limitations
already acknowledged by the authors; see Zhang et al. 2009;
Berridge 2012) is a matter for future research. In any case, we
hope that this paper will serve as stimulus to design computa-
tional models more attuned to the complexmechanisms respon-
sible for the rewarding effects of drugs in real-world contexts.
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